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A number of different philosophical, theoretical, and empirical perspectives on episodic memory have led to the develop-
ment of very different tests with which to assess it. Although these tests putatively assess the same psychological capacity,
they have rarely been directly compared. Here, a sample of undergraduates was tested on three different putative tests of
episodic memory (What-Where-When, Unexpected Question/Source Memory, and Free Recall). It was predicted that to
the extent to which these different tests are assessing the same psychological process, performance across the various
tests should be positively correlated. It was found that not all tests were related and those relationships that did exist
were not always linear. Instead, two tests showed a quadratic relationship, suggesting the contribution of multiple psycho-
logical processes. It is concluded that not all putative tests of episodic cognition are necessarily testing the same thing.
Episodic memory is the ability to mentally relive one’s own past
events. Most psychologists would agree on what episodic memory
is, and that when they discuss this ability they are talking about
the same phenomenon. As Suddendorf and Corballis (2007) put
it, “. . . we know what [episodic memory] is because we can intro-
spectively observe ourselves doing it and because people spend
so much time talking about their recollections.” However, per-
haps because of such reference to the personal experience of
remembering, people tend to have slightly different working def-
initions of episodic memory. Such small differences in working
definition have produced large differences in the behavioral crite-
ria used to study episodic memory, and lead to significant incon-
sistency in how this ability is tested.
As well as being studied in its own right, episodic memory is
investigated within a number of distinct yet overlapping memory
literatures (e.g., source memory, autobiographical memory, long-
term memory), each of whose definitions are in turn distinct yet
overlapping. Furthermore, various literatures within the field
may use the same name for two potentially different processes,
or different names for what may be a single process. On top of
this, psychological tests are sometimes labeled for the way they as-
sess memory (e.g., free recall [FR], cued recall), sometimes for the
nature of what is remembered (e.g., source memory), and some-
times for the memory that they putatively test (episodic memory
test, semantic memory test), though different researchers disagree
on which of the former correspond to which of the latter. Because
of all this, the internal consistency of the episodic memory litera-
ture is limited, with very different tasks being used to assess the
same ability. Unfortunately many of these tasks have never been
tested in the same species, let alone within the same subjects,
and consequently we have no idea to what extent performance
across the various tasks might be related. The present study aims
to address this problem by assessing the extent to which some
of these different putative tests of episodic cognition assess the
same or related cognitive processes in adult humans. To the extent
that these different tests do test the same underlying cognitive
ability, the prediction is that they will be positively correlated
when tested in the same subjects.
Methods of assessing episodic memory
Adult humans are able to verbally report both the content of their
memory and their subjective experience of remembering. As such,
many researchers have investigated episodic cognition using in-
terview or self-report (e.g., Crovitz and Schiffma 1974; Kopelman
et al. 1989; Hashtroudi et al. 1990; Levine et al. 2002; Buckner and
Carroll 2007; Hassabis and Maguire 2007; Schacter and Addis
2007). There is little controversy that measurement of accuracy
and vividness of mental experience through interview can effec-
tively tap episodic processes (e.g., Barr et al. 1990; Hokkanen
et al. 1995; Kapur et al. 1997; Maguire and Mummery 1999; Tana-
ka et al. 1999; Buckner and Carroll 2007; Hassabis et al. 2007;
Addis and Schacter 2008) and these methods are an excellent
way in which to assess the nature of episodic cognition, and its
neural basis. However, in terms of assessing the existence and/
or functionality of episodic cognition in target groups (e.g., pa-
tients, children, animals), tests that rely heavily on both receptive
and productive verbal competence are not always appropriate.
Thus there is a need for behavioral tests of episodic cognition
that are less reliant on verbal capabilities.
Laboratory tests of a cognitive process essentially define a
behavioral criterion: If a subject demonstrates behavior X, then
it can be said to be using mental process Y. To define such a crite-
rion one must have an extremely precise definition of what men-
tal process Y is and how it differs from other processes. However,
consensus on a true behavioral criterion for episodic memory has
proved difficult. In the first instance, different definitions of epi-
sodic memory highlight different defining features. As such, the
behavioral criteria born out of these definitions emphasize differ-
ent features. A related problem is that there is little agreement (yet
little explicit debate) over which behavioral criteria can be said to
test episodic memory itself, and which test related, yet distinct,
processes such as semantic memory, rule-learning, or familiarity.
Small differences in definition lead to large differences in behav-
ioral criteria. So what are the features that different theorists
have argued to be definitive of episodic memory?
Episodic memory must . . . code spatiotemporal
relations: The What-Where-When test
Clayton and Dickinson (1998) have argued that a behavioral crite-
rion for episodic memory could be derived from Tulving’s original
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definition of episodic memory as a system that “receives and stores
information about temporally dated episodes or events, and
temporal-spatial relations among these events” (Tulving et al.
1972); in other words, as a memory for what happened, where,
and when relating to a single past experience (Clayton and
Dickinson 1998). In later writings, Clayton and colleagues empha-
size that for a What-Where-When (WWW) paradigm to be con-
sidered to be testing something resembling episodic memory,
the memory demonstrated must be integrated (i.e., the what,
where, and when elements must form a single representation)
and should be able to be used flexibly to guide behavior (i.e., the
subject should represent the event, not a fixed response rule or in-
tention based on the event [Clayton et al. 2003a,b]). Over the past
15 years, the WWW test has been used extensively to assess
“episodic-like” memory in the animal cognition literature (e.g.,
Clayton and Dickinson 1998; Hampton et al. 2005; Babb and
Crystal 2006; Naqshbandi et al. 2007; Ferkin et al. 2008; Zinkivskay
et al. 2009; Martin-Ordas et al. 2010).
Episodic memory must . . . be internally cued:
The Free Recall test
Memory retrieval can occur in response to external cues that trig-
ger the retrieval of a memory (cued recall) or uncued/in response
to an internally generated cue (free recall [FR]). Tulving (1985) ar-
gued that the contribution of episodic cognition (or rather, the
self-knowing “autonoetic” consciousness that he argues accom-
panies episodic cognition) to memory for items on a list can be as-
sessed by asking subjects if they remembered an item’s occurrence
on the list, or whether they simply knew “on some other basis”
(Tulving 1985) that the item was on the list. He found that sub-
jects were more likely to report “remembering” items from a
word list during a FR task than during a cued recall task (although
this difference was small, 88% compared with 75%). Thus he con-
cluded that if the memory was internally cued by some cognitive
process then it was more likely to be remembered episodically
than if it was externally cued by some information in the environ-
ment (such as the first letter of the to-be-remembered word). This
finding has led to the conclusion by some theorists (e.g., Perner
and Ruffman 1995) that FR tasks tap episodic cognition to a great-
er extent than cued recall tasks. FR tests are extremely common
in the human episodic memory literature (e.g., Tulving 1985;
Wheeler et al. 1995; Herlitz et al. 1997; Backman et al. 2001;
Howard and Kahana 2002) and are included in many neuropsy-
chological evaluations (e.g., Cognitive Drug Research Battery
[CDR], Consortium to Establish a Registry for Alzheimer’s Disease
Neuropsychological Test Battery [CERAD]).
In the majority of tests putatively assessing episodic memory,
there are focal elements (e.g., words on a word list) that are the
center of attention and the subjects are explicitly informed of
the impending memory test. These features set those memory
tests apart from the majority of scenarios in which episodic mem-
ories are encoded and retrieved in everyday life. In reality, memo-
ries are often encoded without the encoder’s knowledge that they
are later to be tested, and memories must often be retrieved about
events that were not the focal element at the time they occurred.
Some schools of thought suggest that these features of episodic
memory can be considered defining. That is, episodic memory is
unique in its catch-all recording of entire events, whether or not
they are deliberately memorized or the central focus of attention
(e.g., Morris and Frey 1997).
This “automatic encoding” feature of episodic memory has
been investigated in two ways. Some researchers (mostly in the an-
imal cognition literature) have emphasized nondeliberate encod-
ing as indicative of episodic memory. In these experiments, the
to-be-remembered item is the center of attention at the time of en-
coding, but the subject is not aware that their memory will be test-
ed. Others (mostly in the human literature) have investigated
memories for contextual details of a learning event, rather than
the “target” item. Here, the to-be-remembered detail is incidental
at the time of encoding, but the subject is (usually) aware that a
memory test will take place.
Episodic memory must . . . be memory for context:
Source memory
Fact memory for focal elements and source memory for contexts
have been established as independent (e.g., Johnson and Raye
1981; Shimamura and Squire 1987) suggesting that they represent
differential memory systems and may be equivalent to semantic
and episodic memory, respectively. Some patients with amnesia
have demonstrated relatively preserved memory for facts learned
during an experimental session, but severely impaired memory
for how and when those facts were learned (e.g., Schacter et al.
1984; Shimamura and Squire 1987). This inability to remember
the source of a remembered fact is known as source amnesia.
Source memory tasks are now extremely widely used in the human
adult (e.g., Shimamura and Squire 1987; Johnson et al. 1993;
Simons et al. 2002; Davachi et al. 2003; Lundstrom et al. 2005) as
well as the developmental episodic memory literature (Gopnik
and Graff 1988; Wimmer et al. 1988; O’Neill and Gopnik 1991;
Taylor et al. 1994; Whitcombe and Robinson 2000; Drummey
and Newcombe 2002). It could be argued that the difference in
memory for focal and contextual features of an event may be
due to the deliberateness of encoding, in that focal items are delib-
erately encoded, while contexts are not.
Episodic memory must . . . not be deliberately
encoded: The unexpected question
Zentall and colleagues (2001, 2008) argue that deliberate encod-
ing of stimuli may lead them to be stored as semantic rather
than episodic memories: “The critical aspect of the question is
that at the time of encoding, there should be no expectation
that one would be asked to retrieve the information” (Zentall
et al. 2008). However, while there is evidence that deliberate en-
coding of information may improve recall performance (e.g.,
Paivio 1971; Bower and Reitman 1972; Craik and Lockhart 1972;
Carlson et al. 1976; Greene 1986; Neill et al. 1990) there is little
evidence to suggest that deliberate encoding reduces the contribu-
tion of episodic memory to recall performance. Shimamura and
Squire (1987) demonstrated that amnesic patients had compara-
ble deficits in fact and source memory, regardless of whether the
fact learning and testing situations were explicit (i.e., subjects
were taught a fact and then tested for the fact and when they
had learned it) or incidental. This finding suggests that knowledge
of the impending memory tests did not reduce the impairment of
the amnesic patients on either fact or source memory, nor did it
increase the relative performance of the controls. Nonetheless,
the unexpected question paradigm has been regularly used by
some researchers in animal cognition (Zentall et al. 2001, 2008;
Singer and Zentall 2007; Fujita et al. 2012; Zhou et al. 2012).
Different ways of testing the same thing?
The behavioral tests reviewed above differ in the criteria they set
with which to measure episodic memory, and thus it is difficult
to compare the results they produce. Nonetheless all of these tasks
have been widely used for many years, and many literature re-
views discuss studies using different methodologies as if they
were equivalent. Only recently have researchers begun to assess
the extent to which these tests assess the same ability.
Tests of episodic memory in adults
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Plancher and colleagues (2010) used memories of a tour
around a virtual town to assess What-Where-When (WWW)
memory in young and elderly adults, and compared performance
on this test to Free Recall (FR) and self-reported memory com-
plaints in everyday life (i.e., a tendency to lose keys, forget names,
etc.). The authors found that WWW performance did not cor-
relate with FR, and that levels of memory complaint in every-
day life correlated significantly with WWW binding ability, but
not with individual elements (what/where/when) or with FR.
This emphasis on the binding of components corresponds with
Clayton and colleagues’ (2003b) arguments that it is not the
content but the integration of the what, where, and when ele-
ments that makes the memory episodic. Furthermore, the discov-
ery that it is the binding of contextual features that is the feature
most correlated with experience of memory problems in every-
day life is consistent with the finding that episodic amnesics are
impaired on object-location, object-order, and object-person-
binding memory, but not on object recognition (Burgess et al.
2002).
Holland and Smulders (2011) found that people’s accuracy in
remembering where they had hidden two different types of coin
(what) on two consecutive days (when) was related to their ability
to remember incidental features of the hiding episodes (i.e., an
Unexpected Question/Source Memory [UQ/SM] test). They also
found that subjects were generally more likely to associate their
WWW memories with the experience of “remembering” rather
than the feeling of “knowing.” This pattern was replicated by
Easton and colleagues (2012), who found that subjects were signif-
icantly more likely to report “remembering” than “knowing”
when they had previously seen a specific object–location–con-
text combination.
The aim of this study is to investigate the relationship be-
tween performance on three putative tests of episodic memory
(What-Where-When, Unexpected Question/Source Memory, and
Free Recall) in order to establish whether they tap into the same
underlying process. The WWW task was a computerized task in
which subjects were asked to hide coins of different types at
different times and were later asked to indicate the location of a
particular type of coin which they hid at a particular time. The
FR task followed the standard procedure of an aurally presented
word list that must be repeated after a delay. The UQ/SM test
involved a series of questions relating to contextual/incidental
features of the other experiments and was administered unex-
pectedly at the end of the study. To investigate the potential con-
tribution of episodic memory to performance on any or all of
the tests, subjects were asked to report on what “strategies” they
used in performing these memory tests. It was predicted that
those individuals who performed better on one test would also
perform better on the others, and that the extent of the relation-
ship would be predicted by the subjects’ self-reported use of “epi-
sodic” strategies.
Results
Performance for each of the tests (WWW, UQ/SM, and FR) is re-
ported, followed by the relationships between performances on
the different tests.
Gender effects
Men and women did not differ in their performance on any of
the tests (FR, t(75) ¼ 21.061, P ¼ 0.292; UQ/SM, t(75) ¼ 1.441,
P ¼ 0.154; WWW, t(65) ¼ 1.471, P ¼ 0.145). As such, all of the fol-
lowing analyses were conducted with data from men and women
combined.
What-Where-When
Subjects had an average integrated WWW score of 0.73
(+0.242)—equivalent to correctly locating 3.6 of the five target
coins. In terms of the individual what, where, and when elements,
subjects on average correctly identified gold coins (“what”) with a
score of 0.8 (+0.217), correctly identified coins from the first hid-
ing episode (“when”) with a score of 0.91 (+0.188), and correctly
located coins (“where”) with a score of 0.9 (+0.164). Thus sub-
jects were generally very successful at the individual elements of
the WWW test, but less successful at integrating this information.
Subjects were differentially successful at the different elements of
the test (Friedman’s ANOVA, F(2) ¼ 16.39, P, 0.001). Planned
contrasts (related samples Wilcoxon) revealed that subjects were
significantly worse at identifying the type of coin (“what”) than
at identifying a coin from the correct hiding period (“when,”
W ¼ 487, P ¼ 0.001) or identifying coin location (“where,” W ¼
486, P ¼ 0.015), but that these latter two elements did not differ
from each other (W ¼ 245, P ¼ 0.322).
Subjects reported their strategies for remembering the loca-
tion of the treasure, although it was often difficult to categorize
these reports, given that many of them could be either semantic
or episodic. Conservatively, only “re-experiencing” and “narra-
tive” strategies were termed episodic; 30% of subjects reported us-
ing such methods. Overall, 48% of subjects reported hiding coins
in a specific order and then using the order as a retrieval cue, 35%
reported using landmarks, 26% reported “re-experiencing” the
hiding event, 19% reported matching the color of the background
to the color of the coin when hiding, and thus identifying loca-
tion–identify combinations according to color, 4% reported cre-
ating a story out of the locations, and 4% reported using the
geometry of the screen to identify locations. There was no signifi-
cant difference in performance between those reporting “episod-
ic” strategies (re-experiencing or story creation) and those not
(t(69) ¼ 0.887, P ¼ 0.378).
Unexpected Question/Source Memory
Subjects scored an average of 0.61 (+0.119) in the UQ/SM
test, which is equivalent to 6.7 correct answers out of the 11
questions.
In the debrief, 87% of subjects reported using an episodic
strategy in the UQ/SM test, while only 27% reported using a
semantic strategy. Specifically, 80% of subjects reported visualiz-
ing the context they were attempting to remember, 40% reported
guessing, 19% “just knew” the answers, 10% reported using logi-
cal inference to infer the answers, and 6% reported attempting to
visualize, but being unable to. Because only four people did not
report at least one episodic strategy, it was not possible to compare
performances of those reporting episodic strategies and those re-
porting only semantic strategies or guessing.
Free Recall
On average, the subjects achieved a score of 0.389 (+0.146) on the
Free Recall test. This is equivalent to recalling approximately11
words out of a possible 28.
In the debrief, 53% of subjects reported using an episodic
strategy while 48% reported using a semantic strategy (subjects
could report as many strategies as they felt they used, so the
same subjects contribute to multiple categories). Specifically,
40% reported visualizing the words, 35% reported linking the
words together, 20% of people reported mentally hearing the ex-
perimenter’s voice, 14% reported that they “just knew” that the
words had appeared on the list, 10% reported creating a narrative
out of the words, 5% reported sorting the words into categories
Tests of episodic memory in adults
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and using these as retrieval cues, and 5% reported remembering
their own thoughts in response to hearing the words. There was
no significant difference in performance between people report-
ing (any) episodic and those reporting (only) semantic strategies
(t(38) ¼ 20.230, P ¼ 0.819).
Memory tests overall
The subjects’ scores on all three memory tests were averaged into a
single “memory score,” influenced equally by performance on all
three tests. The subjects’ self-reported strategies were grouped
across the memory tests and scored according to the number of
tests in which subjects reported using episodic strategies (1, 2, or
3). This was used as a metric of “tendency to use episodic cogni-
tion.” There was no “0” score because only two subjects never re-
ported using an episodic strategy in any of the tests. There was no
effect of the tendency to use episodic strategies on the overall
memory score (F(3) ¼ 0.845, P ¼ 0.474). This suggests that those
subjects reporting episodic strategies were neither more nor less
successful overall in the memory tests.
The relationship between memory tests
Figure 1 illustrates the relationships between performances on
the different memory tests. The graphs appear to illustrate a linear
correlation between WWW and FR, and a quadratic relationship
between WWW and UQ/SM. The graph indicates no clear rela-
tionship between FR and UQ/SM. Statistical analysis supports
this interpretation. Relationships between the memory tests were
assessed using Pearson’s correlations to assess linear relationships
and using univariate general linear models (GLMs) to assess non-
linear relationships. There was a significant positive correlation
between WWW and FR (R ¼ 0.233, P ¼ 0.041), which was driven
by subjects who reported episodic strategies in the FR test (epi-
sodic, R ¼ 0.514, P ¼ 0.014; semantic, R ¼ 20.344, P ¼ 0.163)
(see Fig. 1). There was no correlation between UQ/SM and either
FR or WWW (FR-UQ/SM, R ¼ 20.124, P ¼ 0.281; WWW-UQ/
SM, R ¼ 20.024, P ¼ 0.833).
The lack of correlation between the performance in the
WWW and UQ/SM tests may have been due to a nonlinear rela-
tionship. Univariate GLM revealed a quadratic relationship be-
tween WWW and UQ/SM scores (UQ/SM, F(1,74) ¼ 3.733, P ¼
0.057; UQ/SM2, F(1,74) ¼ 4.343, P ¼ 0.041). This suggests that sub-
jects who performed very well or very badly on the WWW test per-
form poorly on the UQ/SM test, while subjects who performed
moderately on the WWW test perform well on the UQ/SM test.
By contrast, there was no quadratic relationship between FR and
UQ/SM (UQ/SM, F(1,74) ¼ 0.660, P ¼ 0.419; UQ/SM2, F(1,74) ¼
0.713, P ¼ 0.401) overall, or when only subjects who reported ep-
isodic strategies in the FR test were included (UQ/SM, F(1,74) ¼
0.023, P ¼ 0.881; UQ/SM2, F(1,74) ¼ 0.022, P ¼ 0.884).
Discussion
A sample of undergraduates was tested on three putative episodic
memory tests (WWW, UQ/SM, and FR). The only significant cor-
relation was between WWW and FR. There was a possible quadrat-
ic relationship between WWW and UQ/SM, suggesting that those
who performed very well or very badly on WWW were less accu-
rate on UQ/SM than those who performed moderately. There
was no relationship between UQ/SM and FR. The finding that
WWW did not correlate with UQ/SM is in contrast to previous
findings that WWW performance correlated positively with
UQ/SM (Holland and Smulders 2011). However, there are a num-
ber of methodological differences between that study and the one
presented here that may have resulted in this contrasting finding
(for example, the unexpected questions in Holland and Smul-
ders’s study were in a yes/no format, while in the present study
they were open-ended).
According to subjects’ self-reports, they used an almost equal
mix of episodic and semantic strategies in the FR test. This is in
contrast to UQ/SM where almost all subjects reported using an
episodic strategy. In none of the memory tests was there a signi-
ficant effect of reporting using an episodic strategy on perfor-
mance. This result is similar to that demonstrated by Easton and
colleagues (2012), who found that when subjects were asked to
recall when they had previously seen a particular object–location
combination, their answers were significantly more likely to be
“remembered” than “known.” However, whether subjects report-
ed “remembering” or “knowing” the answer did not have any
effect on their performance. Interestingly, reports of “knowing”
in the current study were relatively common in the FR and
UQ/SM tests (14% and 19%, respectively) but not in the WWW,
Figure 1. Relationship between memory tests. (A) Relationship between What-Where-When (WWW) and Unexpected Question/Source Memory (UQ/
SM). (B) Relationship between WWW and Free Recall (FR). (C) Relationship between UQ/SM and FR. Error bars represent standard error.
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in which “knowing” was not reported by any subject. This sup-
ports the findings of Holland and Smulders (2011) and Easton
and colleagues (2012) that WWW tests are overwhelmingly re-
ported as “remembered” rather than “known” (when given the
option only between these two reports). However, this may also
suggest that the type of memories tapped by WWW tests do
not lend themselves to being reported using the word “known,”
but that this does not necessarily mean they are episodically
“remembered”; simply that “known” is not an appropriate word
to describe the experience.
It is interesting to note that the relationship between WWW
and UQ/SM was U-shaped. Such a pattern of results may indicate
the contribution of multiple factors to performance. Episodic
memories are constrained and specified (“scaffolded”) by known
facts about the world. For example, if someone knows that there
were 28 words on a word list, they are more likely to attempt to re-
call all 28 words—potentially resulting in recall of more words
than if they were unaware of the number of words on the list. In
both the WWW and FR tests (but not the UQ/SM test) subjects
had the opportunity to use encoding strategies to aid their mem-
ories. The use of deliberate encoding strategies may have increased
the contribution of such semantic “scaffolding.” For example,
subjects may have mentally categorized the words, leading them
to know that there were two words relating to body parts and at-
tempt to remember both. In contrast, those engaged in answering
an unexpected question on a single unusual event (hiding virtual
treasure on a computer-generated island) have very little semantic
scaffold (that is, few facts) to support their memory. Specifically,
there is both no opportunity to deliberately encode semantic scaf-
folds (such as rules about where certain items are located) nor (in
this study, at least) is there much of a knowledge base to rely upon
(there is not, for example, a “usual” number of birds in a virtual
beach scene). This test, however, is far more likely to be affected
by subjects not encoding items in the first place, for example
because they didn’t pay attention to the item. The varying degree
of contribution from semantic knowledge to test performance is
likely to affect the degree of relationship between different tasks
and contribute to the U-shaped relationship we see between
WWW and UQ/SM.
One possible reason for the low level of correlations between
tests is that there may have been low intra-test consistency (i.e.,
low reliability). This is a recurring problem with tests of memory
(e.g., Dikmen et al. 1999), suggesting that even different items
within the same memory test may be testing the same thing the-
oretically, but not empirically. Unfortunately, reliability measures
could not be taken for the tests used in this study due to low item-
numbers and single-block testing. However, even if we assume
that each test had a level of reliability comparable to standard ver-
bal FR tests (i.e., around 0.6–0.7 [Lowe and Rabbitt 1998]) this
would be in the range of “poor” to “questionable” by standard
rules of thumb (Kline 1999). Thus weak and absent correlations
between memory tests may be the result of weak or absent corre-
lations within memory tests. Such a possibility does not weaken,
but rather adds to the argument that focus is needed to improve
the consistency of episodic memory measures, both within and
between tests.
The different tests explored in this study have arisen out of
different perspectives on what the “defining features” of episodic
memory are, and as such they explicitly test different mnemonic
skills. The WWW test explicitly requires the ability to bind spatio-
temporal features. This binding process has been shown to be
specifically affected by the aging process and is predictive of self-
reported everyday memory impairment in a way that individual
what, where, and when elements, as well as word-list FR, are not
(Plancher et al. 2010). By contrast, the UQ/SM task explicitly re-
quires the ability to reanalyze previous experiences for new in-
formation, something not required by the other tasks. Finally,
the FR task assesses the ability to mentally initiate and guide re-
trieval in the absence of external cueing (as is present in both
the WWW and UQ/SM tasks). While these different elements
are by no means the only important features of episodic memory
(others include, for example, reality monitoring and emotion
memory), they are all integral elements of episodic memory as
it is used in everyday life. They also cannot, by definition, all
be assessed by the same task. As such, while the small number
and potential nonlinearity of relationships between these dif-
ferent tasks may be considered a weakness of the literature at
present, it has the potential to become a great strength. If these
tasks can be developed, along with others, into a battery of epi-
sodic cognition tests, then this might have great potential for
assessing the functionality of an extremely multifaceted cogni-
tive ability. Such a battery would be capable of assessing perfor-
mance on different types or components of episodic memory
and might therefore have significantly more ability to predict def-
icits in everyday functioning than any one test alone. Such a pros-
pect relies on the assumption that these tests are all, in their own
way, measures of some “core” episodic memory ability. The self-
report judgments described here, as well as the remember/know
judgments in previous studies (e.g., Tulving 1985; Holland and
Smulders 2011; Easton et al. 2012; Mickes et al. 2013) provide
hope that this may, indeed, be the case, although further research
is needed.
In summary, the findings presented here demonstrate some
relationships between the different types of episodic memory
test (WWW, UQ/SM, and FR). Figure 1 indicates that FR was
positively correlated with WWW, and WWW had a quadratic
relationship with UQ/SM, but that there was no relationship be-
tween FR and UQ/SM. The presence of quadratic relationships
may be indicative of the contribution of multiple factors. Such
a small degree of relationship between these tasks does not en-
courage confidence that these tests are assessing the exact same
underlying cognitive process. Given these results, researchers
of episodic cognition should proceed with caution when direct-
ly comparing literature using different methodologies. Which
test is the “true” test of episodic cognition is yet to be determined.
Indeed, it is likely that such a thing does not and cannot
exist. Thus it is possible that, as in the field of IQ, research em-
phasis should be placed not on a particular “true” test of this
multifaceted cognitive ability, but on developing a battery of
tests that encompass all its diverse qualities. Such a battery may
make it possible for non/less verbal tests of episodic memory
to provide a similar level of assessment as interview/self-report-
based assessments.
Materials and Methods
The experiments took place in a room in the Department of
Experimental Psychology, Cambridge, in the spring of 2011.
The department was renamed Department of Psychology in
October 2012.
Subjects
The sample consisted of 77 subjects, of whom 42 were male.
Subjects were undergraduates at the University of Cambridge,
aged between 18 and 23 years.
Memory tests
What-Where-When
The WWW test was conducted in the form of a computer game.
Participants took on the character of “Swashbuckle,” a pirate
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who has run aground on a desert island and must hide all his trea-
sure before his evil rival “Pinkbeard” arrives to steal it. To hide
the treasure, subjects could navigate between three locations
on a “treasure map”: the beach, the village, and the mountain.
Clicking on any of these locations took the subject to the appro-
priate “scene,” where they could then hide the treasure. The trea-
sure was presented in two virtual treasure chests, one containing
gold coins and one containing silver coins, from which subjects
could drag and drop individual coins into virtual scenes, where
they would disappear (see Fig. 2). Before beginning to hide the
treasure, subjects were informed that Swashbuckle would have
to find the treasure again, and thus to try to remember where it
was hidden. After the subjects had hidden half of their treasure
(five gold and five silver coins) they were informed that the
sun was going down and they would have to continue “in the
morning.” There followed a delay in which subjects undertook a
planning task (reported elsewhere). They were then told that
it was now morning and that they should finish hiding the
treasure. When all the treasure was hidden, it was revealed that
Swashbuckle’s treasure was, in fact, stolen from a leprechaun,
meaning that the gold coins would disappear if left outside over-
night. The subjects were then asked to identify on each scene
the locations (“where”) gold coins (“what”) had been hidden be-
fore Swashbuckle slept (“when”) (i.e., the treasure that would
have disappeared). They did so by clicking on the area of the
map that they thought they had hidden it, thus producing an
“X” to mark the spot. Subjects made five “X marks the spot” judg-
ments in total.
The accuracy of subjects’ coin location was measured in
terms both of integrated WWW and individual what, where,
and when elements. The integrated WWW score was calculated
by assessing whether there was a “target” coin (i.e., a gold coin
from the first hiding period) within 60 pixels (two coin widths)
of the subject’s “X marks the spot.” The individual “What” and
“When” elements were coded in terms of the identity (what)
and origin (when) of the nearest coin to the subject’s “X marks
the spot.” Thus if the nearest coin was gold, subjects were coded
as correct for “what” and if the nearest coin was hidden during
the first hiding session they were coded as correct for “when.”
The “where” element was calculated in terms of absolute distance
from any coin. If there was a coin within 60 pixels of the subject’s
“X marks the spot,” they were coded as correct for “where.” To pre-
vent subjects from reporting the same coin multiple times, indi-
vidual coins that had contributed to the score (either integrated
or individual) on a previous “X marks the spot” judgment it was
discounted from subsequent judgments and the next nearest
coin was considered.
Unexpected Question/Source Memory
Participants were unexpectedly asked 11 questions about aspects
of the WWW test at the end of the computer session (see Table
1). Questions were relatively evenly distributed between asking
identity-related questions (e.g., “What animal was there in the
village scene?”), spatial questions (e.g., “Which of the pirate’s
shoulders was the parrot sitting on?”), and number questions
(e.g., “How many birds were there in the beach scene?”). This
was designed such that the questions did not differ in content
from the WWW questions, but simply differed in the fact that
they (1) were unexpected, (2) did not explicitly require integra-
tion of memory for what, where, and when, and (3) were assess-
ing memory for nonfocal features of the event. For our purposes,
contextual or “nonfocal” elements were those elements of the
scene which were not central to the task that the subject was
undergoing at the time of encoding (WWW). Any of these “con-
textual” items could have been removed from the WWW task
altogether and the subject could still have completed it. In con-
trast, a “focal item” was defined as something the subject had
to attend to in order to solve the WWW task, for example, the
color of coin, where they hid it, or when. The questions were
open-ended; subjects typed their answers into blank boxes. To
make sure all subjects answered all questions, participants were
not permitted to continue until they had typed an answer in
every box.
Figure 2. Schematic of WWW pirate game hiding phase. Clicking on
any of the symbols on the map takes the subject to one of the three
scenes: mountain (top), beach (right), or village (bottom). At the bottom
of each scene were two treasure chests from which subjects could drag
and drop gold or silver coins into the scene to hide them.
Table 1. “Unexpected” questions asked at the end of the
session
1. What color was Swashbuckle’s shirt?
2. Which of Pinkbeard’s shoulders was his parrot sitting on?
3. Was the beach on the east or west of the island?
4. Of the three scenes, how many contained a bird’s nest?
5. How many trees were there in the volcano scene?
6. Was the lake on the left or the right of the screen in the volcano
scene?
7. Which animal was there in the village?
8. What color were the roofs of the huts in the village?
9. How many birds were there in the beach scene?
10. What color were the birds in the beach scene?
11. How many starfish were there in the beach scene?
Table 2. Fourteen high-concreteness (m ¼ 6.49), high-imagery
(m ¼ 6.39) words and 14 low-concreteness (m ¼ 2.44), low-imagery
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Free Recall
A list of 28 words was selected from a list of 925 nouns that were
rated for abstractness and imagery (Paivio et al. 1968) (see Table
2). Fourteen words were selected for scoring highly in “imagery”
and “concreteness” while 14 words were selected for having low
“imagery” and “concreteness” scores.
Participants were read the word list and then immediate-
ly asked to recall it. They were then read the list in a different
order and informed that they would be asked to recall the list
again at the end of the experiment. The retention interval lasted
30 min, in which subjects undertook the computerized tests
(WWW, UQ/SM, and a planning task).
Procedure
The WWW and UQ/SM were computer based and in the form
of video games. The FR test was administered orally by the
experimenter.
The procedure was a nested design in which the phases of the
different tests formed the retention interval for the other tests.
Thus every subject received the tests in a set order. Some of the
retention intervals were spent undergoing a future-planning
task (reported elsewhere). The subjects underwent the encoding
phase of the FR test before starting the computer-based tests.
They then undertook the WWW test. Between the first and second
encoding episode of the WWW test, subjects undertook the plan-
ning task. The WWW test phase occurred immediately after the
second encoding phase. The final section of the computer game
was the UQ/SM test. Finally, the subjects were asked to verbally
recall the words that were read to them at the beginning of the ses-
sion. The subjects were then debriefed about the nature and pur-
pose of the experiment, during which they were asked to give
their consent for the use of their data and to report on how they
went about the different memory tests (see Table 3). Their answers
were coded into categories that captured the essence of the report
(Table 4). For FR and UQ/SM, these were then further coded
into episodic and semantic strategies. For the WWW test, many
of the different strategies could be interpreted as either episodic
or semantic. Interestingly, many strategies offered by subjects
involved methods both of encoding and retrieval, and often the
encoding and retrieval elements of the strategies could not be
separated.
As such the strategies are not subdivided into encoding
and retrieval strategies, but coded as episodic or semantic on
the basis of whether it involved the phenomenology of re-ex-
periencing or added spatiotemporal information to the mem-
ory at encoding (such as creating a “narrative” from the hiding
period; this included memory palaces and method of loci
techniques).
Analyses
To make them comparable, scores on all memory tests were recal-
culated as a proportion, such that the maximum score was 1 and
the minimum score was 0. Where assumptions of normality were
met, data were analyzed using paired and independent samples
t-tests and Pearson’s correlation. Where the data did not meet as-
sumptions of normality, Friedman’s ANOVA, related-sample
Wilcoxon, and Kendell’s t correlations were used. Nonlinear rela-
tionships between tests were assessed using a univariate general
linear model (GLM).
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Table 4. Categories of self-reported memory strategies
Free Recall Unexpected Question What-Where-When
Heard Visualized Order
Felt that they could hear experimenters
voice in their head
Felt that they could see the scene in
their head
Hid the coins in a specific order and used this rule
to infer “what” and “when”
Visualized Failed visualization Color-matching
Felt that they could see the words in
their head
Attempted to see the scene in their
head, but couldn’t
Hid coins in areas of a similar color and thus used
color as a retrieval cue for “what” and “where”
Categorized Guessed Landmark
Categorized words into different types Aware that answer was total guess Used salient landmarks when hiding and retrieving
Linked Semantics Revisited
Linked words together Used logical inference to reach answer Mentally “went back” to the hiding event
Knew Knew Story/memory palace
“Just knew” “Just knew” Made the hiding event into a narrative
Made a story Geometry
Turned the word list into a narrative Used the geometry of the screen when hiding and
retrieving
Remembered own thoughts
Remembered what they were thinking at
the time
These were categorized by two coders with 91% agreement. Those presented in pale gray were coded as episodic strategies and those presented in darker gray
were coded as semantic strategies, while those presented in white were coded as either/neither.
Table 3. Self-report questions asked to subjects for each memory
test
Test Question
What-Where-When “How do you think you went about




“How do you think you went about
answering the questions presented on
the screen?”
Free Recall “How do you think you recalled the
words from the word list?”
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